Tag: Indian Diplomacy

Guide to Modi’s Win-Win Foreign Policy

A Jargon-Free Guide to Narendra Modi’s (Mostly) Win-Win Foreign Policy

By Sanjoy Narayan

Just two things from last weekend can give you a huge insight into the manner in which India’s foreign policy has undergone a significant transformation under the leadership of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who completes 10 years at the helm of India’s government and is poised to win another five-year term. But first the two things (spoiler: both have to do with S. Jaishankar, Modi’s foreign minister and close confidant when it comes to anything to do with India’s international policy).

One. Last Friday, at an event to launch the Marathi version of his book, Jaishankar said: “Whosoever will be the President of America will have good relations with India, because America will always want to have a partnership with Prime Minister Modi.”

Two. At the same event, in an obvious reference to cross-border terrorism from Pakistan, he also said: “They (terrorists) should not think; we are this side of the line, so no one could attack us. Terrorists do not play by any rules. The answer to terrorists cannot have any rules.”

Both those statements by India’s foreign minister are accurate. I would amend the first a bit by substituting “partnership with Prime Minister Modi” with “partnership with India” but then we should not mind Jaishankar’s preference for mentioning the name of his boss. 

Indo-US relations and the China factor

Let’s start with the first statement. India’s relationship with the US has pivoted in the past couple of decades and has been warming for several reasons but for the US, the most important of them is the dynamics of China’s rise and its implications for regional stability. US-China relations have been deteriorating ever since the US started worrying about China’s military buildup and its assertiveness in the South China Sea. Then, in 2018, a trade war began under the Trump administration with both countries imposing tariffs on each other’s goods. In 2020, the tension escalated over the handling and origins of the COVID-19 pandemic and issues such as the handling of Hong Kong and the treatment of Uighurs in Xinjiang. 

Strategically, the US supports India’s emergence as a leading global power in the region and sees it as a counterbalance to China’s rise. This strategic interest, coupled with economic interests and shared democratic values, has contributed to the strengthening of the US-India relations. 

The two countries now cooperate in areas such as defence, trade, technology, and climate change. So, to paraphrase Jaishankar, no matter who becomes the next occupant of the White House, the US will always want to have India as a partner, no matter what. When Canada accused India of being involved in the murder of a Sikh separatist on Canadian soil, the US was remarkably guarded in its response, simply because it needs India strategically. 

For India, it is a win-win. It follows a policy of strategic autonomy and has avoided becoming a formal ally of the US, which allows it to follow an independent foreign policy that can also sometimes diverge from what the US would ideally expect. Case in point: India’s relations with Russia.

Indo-Russian relations and the economic factor

While the US-led West has imposed heavy sanctions on trade with Russia following its invasion of Ukraine, India has maintained its historical bond with Russia. India buys Russian oil, weapons and trade between the two continues to be robust. In the financial year 2024, India bought 35% of its oil imports from Russia. India and China together buy an estimated 80% of Russia’s oil. In 2023, India spent $15.2 billion on Russian oil. For Russia, embroiled as it is in a war in Ukraine since February 2022, such revenue is of critical importance. 

Arguably, those earnings could be financing Russian President Vladimir Putin’s onslaught against Ukraine but for India, it is a win-win. Because India has been buying Russian oil at discounted rates. Following the sanctions imposed on Russia, Russian Urals crude has been selling at a discount. For instance, at one point, it was more than $30 a barrel cheaper than Brent crude, the global benchmark.

Indo-Chinese relations and the tension factor

If India’s relations with the US and with Russia can be said to be determined by strategy and economics, respectively, its relations with China are much more complex. It is marked by both cooperation and contention. Continuing border disputes with China have strained ties between the two countries. 

The border disputes over areas in the north-eastern part of India are long-standing. Recently, Prime Minister Modi highlighted the “urgent need to address” the prolonged situation on the borders to resolve the “abnormality in bilateral interactions”. There have been ongoing diplomatic efforts to ease the tensions, but there has been no breakthroughs.

A new controversy has been over China renaming territories by issuing standardised names in Mandarin for places within India’s Arunachal Pradesh, which China refers to as Zangnan. India has strongly condemned this move, with the Indian defence minister questioning the logic behind the renaming and asserting that such actions cannot change the fact that Arunachal Pradesh is an integral part of India. The U.S. has also reacted to this development.

These actions by China are seen as attempts to assert its territorial claims over the region, which India rejects. The renaming of territories is part of a broader pattern of assertiveness by China in its border disputes, but India maintains its stance that Arunachal Pradesh is, and will always be, an integral part of its territory. The situation remains sensitive.

India also fears security threats from China. In 2020, it banned 59 Chinese-made apps, including popular ones like TikTok and WeChat, citing them as a danger to the country’s sovereignty, integrity, and national security.

Yet, Indo-Chinese relations aren’t that simple. Despite the border tensions, trade between India and China has not only continued but has reached new heights. In 2022, the trade volume between the two countries was at an all-time high of  $135.98 billion, with India’s trade deficit with China crossing the $100 billion mark for the first time. This was despite India’s efforts to become more self-reliant and reduce its dependence on Chinese imports. However, imports from China have remained strong mainly because they are cheap.

Indo-Pak relations and the big daddy factor

I began this piece by listing two recent statements by India’s foreign minister but tackled only the first. The second too is of significance. When Jaishankar said the “answer to terrorism cannot have rules”, he could have likely been referring to a report in The Guardian, which alleged that India’s external intelligence agency, Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW), conducted operations deep inside Pakistan to neutralise wanted terrorists. That statement reflects the tough stance that India now adopts when it comes to cross-border terrorism from Pakistan, particularly in Kashmir. 

Elsewhere, in its South Asian neighborhood, India under Modi has tried to reassert its leadership role. Its ‘Neighbourhood First’ policy aims to foster better relations, but challenges persist. India’s influence faces competition from China’s economic clout, as Beijing invests heavily in regional infrastructure projects.

Modi’s global ambitions are also reflected in India’s outreach to Africa and the Middle East. In Africa, India has focused on development partnerships and trade, positioning itself as an alternative to China’s resource-driven approach. In the Middle East, energy security and the welfare of the Indian diaspora (66% of non-resident Indians live in the Middle East) have guided its policies, leading to stronger ties with nations like Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

As Modi likely heads into a third term, what kind of foreign policy should we expect? For sure, the policy of “strategic autonomy” that has now become familiar will continue with India navigating the complex geopolitical web of the world by blending pragmatism with national interest. That strategy will also gain heft from  India’s economic might–it could soon become the third largest economy in the world. To sum up, it would be: Modi’s win-win foreign policy.

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Ukraine Crisis: A Diplomatic Opportunity for India

By Dr. Krishnendra Meena

India’s External Affairs Minister, Dr Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, has had to deal with a very difficult foreign policy challenge for India that arose from the Russian invasion into Ukraine. However, his deft handling of the situation has proved his mettle. The diplomatic challenge needed juggling several interests and conflicts at the same time. So far, Indian Foreign Ministry has handled the issue with skill without coming under any pressure from the parties pulling in different directions, including USA, Russia and China as well as other smaller groups.

The 2+2 dialogue between India and the United States of America combined with the video call between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Joe Biden is significant for various reasons. It provided an opportunity for India and the US to better locate concerns of the other party vis-à-vis the Russian invasion.

For India it is important to pacify the world community about its reluctance to vote on numerous occasions on the Russian aggression, at the United Nations. Though India professes a neutral stand, it is part of a group with North Korea, Iran and China. This causes apprehensions among the US and its NATO allies as India has acquired respectability and status due to its economic strength and recently due to its efforts to mitigate the effects of COVID 19 pandemic. However, during the current situation, India has also maintained that any form of armed aggression upon another sovereign nation is unacceptable.

The 2+2 dialogue may have been an apt platform to clarify to the US, the reasons behind India’s neutral stand on Russia’s aggression. On the other hand, it is common knowledge that India’s defence sector and its numerous weapons systems are structurally dependent upon Russia’s arms and weapons industry. It is estimated that Russian arms equipment and weapons systems account for close to 70% of India’s defence supplies.

Against this background, it is perhaps easy to comprehend India’s neutrality and its absenteeism on crucial votes against Russia in the UN, which has wrongly been perceived as pro-Russia. The pressure, nevertheless, on India from the US and in general the West, has been unrelenting since the invasion began. India, though, has stuck to its position, bearing in mind the consequences thereof and the options it may possess. During this difficult period, however, the Indian establishment’s deft diplomacy and strategic autonomy has prominently been on display.

At the centre of this tumultuous and testing period for Indian diplomatic establishment, Dr Jaishankar has shown exemplary geopolitical acumen. Under his leadership the MEA anticipated Western response to India’s position and has crafted befitting and optimum rejoinders. Since the beginning of the Ukraine crisis, statements from the MEA have been measured and calibrated to pacify the international community.

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India has maintained that any act of violent aggression against a sovereign state is deplorable and have urged the warring parties to resolve the crisis diplomatically. Such astute stance and demeanour have in turn led the international community to recognize that it is national interest that has driven India’s voting behaviour at the UN, the precise message that India wanted to convey.

In the contemporary world, any event of such magnitude like the Russian invasion of Ukraine has a ripple effect on the entire world. India’s recent proclivity toward the United States and the new alliances in the Indian Ocean and the Indo-Pacific region has also felt the tremors.

The formulation of the term Indo-Pacific and the subsequent implementation of a counter China strategy through the Quadrilateral Dialogue (QUAD) have been gradually gaining strength in the recent years. Ukraine Crisis and Indian response brought the QUAD and its members to reassess the situation, which is visible in the visits of Heads of states to New Delhi. The Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida visited New Delhi for an Annual Summit meeting under the ‘Special Strategic and Global Partnership’, but a large part of meeting was devoted to the Ukraine crisis. India accommodated Japanese concerns on the crisis in the statement issued after the deliberations.

Immediately after the Indo-Japan Summit, the Australian PM Scott Morrison also held a virtual summit with Prime Minister Modi. The Aussie PM, while condemning the Russian actions in Ukraine, elicited an understanding of the Indian stance. Further, he elaborated that “he and Modi were of the opinion that the conflict could not be a reason for diverting attention from issues of the Indo-Pacific region”. This indicated that the relationship is not affected. A subtext hidden in the outcome and statements of both summit meetings is a clear indication that geographical distance from an international event still matters. The location of the crisis at the western end of the Eurasian landmass and away from the Indo-Pacific space remains instrumental in geopolitical thinking of Japan and Australia.

The aforementioned summits and their timing point to India’s rising significance in the international system and particularly in the Indo-Pacific. It was only befitting that the Chinese Foreign Minister, Mr. Wang Yi visited New Delhi soon after. This holds tremendous weight in the wake of the ongoing crisis in Eastern Ladakh since the summer of 2020.

It was understood that the Chinese FM was here to invite and persuade the Indian PM to join the BRICS summit in China to be held later in the year. Under the circumstances, Indian diplomacy under the leadership of Dr. Jaishankar has been steadfast and clear in conveying to the Chinese that normalization of relations between the two Asian giants is possible only after complete disengagement at the LAC in Ladakh. Hopefully, before the BRICS Summit, negotiations on the issue will bear results.

Therefore it can be said that the Ukraine Crisis has been turned into a diplomatic opportunity by the Indian diplomatic establishment. The 2+2 summit, Modi-Biden virtual Summit, Indo-Japan Summit, Modi-Morrison virtual summit and finally the visit by the Chinese FM are a testimony to clarity in India’s diplomacy since the crisis began. Moreover, the British Prime Minister Mr. Boris Johnson and the President of the European Union, Ms. Ursula von der Leyen have also visited India in the last week.

Whether it is India’s stand on the crisis or its India’s economic strength or the West’s need, India has become the go-to-destination in the face of deep Russia-China partnership. India has been able to drive home the point that India’s national interests take precedence over international linkages and alliances under the able leadership of Dr. S. Jaishankar, the Minister of External Affairs. This perhaps is the proverbial feather in the cap for Modi government as the top diplomat was elevated to the post of External Affairs Minister in May 2019.

Taliban In Afghanistan: India’s Options

By Dr. Krishnendra Meena

Now that the Taliban has been declared winner in Afghanistan and its elected President Ashraf Ghani fled the country on August 15, 2021 without putting up a fight, the world, especially those in the region are assessing the implications of Taliban rule. The departure of United States Armed forces has been the catalyst for the series of events and emerging geopolitical shifts that will necessitate new thinking in Indian Foreign policy.

US entered Afghanistan to eliminate the Al Qaeda network and its Taliban supporters who were responsible for the attacks on the United States soil. The leader of Al Qaeda responsible for the 9/11 attacks has been eliminated but the Al Qaeda network survives as obviously do the Taliban. The United States may still have some influence on the new Taliban, but for India the political terrain is tectonically different.

India is invested heavily in Afghanistan since the end of the Cold War. In terms of geopolitics in South Asia, Afghanistan accords a vantage point for India vis-à-vis Pakistan, it’s arch-rival. Matters are complicated further with the realization that China with its financial muscle and intention to expand the Belt and Road Initiative will find a stronghold in Afghanistan. Beijing made overtures to the Taliban leadership and met them in Qatar recently. With strong China-Pakistan relationship, India’s situation in the region becomes precarious as it may not have any leverage on its Western expanse.

India’s western borders have remained a concern historically and it expends a lot of energy and investment to consolidate and remain visible in the region. With its immediate neighbour Pakistan, not an ideal one, New Delhi looks towards Afghanistan and Iran, to both manage the western neighbourhood and to balance Pakistan.

India, therefore, has made significant investments in Iran and Afghanistan which are Pakistan’s neighbours towards west. India, imports crude oil from Iran even at the displeasure of the USA, and has invested in creating infrastructure (Schools, Hospitals and Roads) in Afghanistan. It has remained a cornerstone of India’s western geographical strategy.

The returns New Delhi may have been expecting in the form of connectivity and transport networks in the region now stand jeopardized. Under the New Silk Road Strategy of the USA, India would have gained access to Central Asia through Iran and Afghanistan. The current situation, however, alters the dynamic as the Taliban have expressed their resentment with India in the recent past and have gone to declare it as an adversary. India’s increasing proximity towards the United States may have resulted in the Taliban to dislike India.

Pakistan, on the other hand, has harboured the Taliban in safe havens on its Western tribal provinces during their difficult years and will influence decision-making in Afghanistan. Furthermore, it will work towards negating India and reducing its existing footprint in Afghanistan. As China has already approached the Taliban it is likely to extend its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects into Afghanistan via the China Pakistan Economic Corridor. In collaboration with regional power China, Pakistan will work to reduce India’s engagement in Afghanistan. The current geopolitical situation, therefore, is favourable for Pakistan.

India needs to take these developments into its stride and create opportunities to engage with the Taliban afresh. A positive beginning could be acceptance of the Taliban as the current interlocutors for Afghan people.

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Internationally, a host of states have expressed their willingness to talk to Taliban as the ruling dispensation of Afghanistan. It may be because of the swiftness with which Taliban has occupied Afghanistan and it seems there is no challenge to Taliban and a civil war is unlikely. India also needs to engage with the Taliban for multiple reasons ranging from the investments made there to the inclusion in connectivity projects to pure geostrategic concerns. India can take heart from the fact that it evokes a lot of goodwill among the Afghan people.

Significantly enough, questions remain about the capacity of Taliban to govern a complex country. First, it will have to raise an economy from scratch to employ the younger generation of Afghanistan (60% of Afghan population is below 20 years of age). Whether China and Pakistan, two main allies of Taliban will be able to revive Afghanistan, remains to be seen. Second, current dominance of Taliban over the entire country will come under strain when local tribal warlords gather strength, aided by the West. The irony is that Taliban will still be riding the infrastructure built by the United States and its allies and India, whom they despise.

Third, acceptability for Taliban in the international system will also depend on the issue of human rights, most importantly women’s rights as they impose Shari’a law under the Islamic Republic in the territory. It is the fear of reprisals from the Taliban and the Shari’a which is causing the mass exodus of Afghans.

India, has been a favoured destination for common Afghans for generations and the international opinion is against the Taliban. India’s diplomatic efforts and negotiating capabilities to engage with the Taliban government will be crucial in the days and years to come. India must forsake idealistic notions in a realist world and should diplomatically engage with Taliban to protect its interests and to stay relevant in the region.