Two Get Bail in Bhima-Koregaon Case But is the Case Merely a Witch Hunt?

Last weekend India’s Supreme Court granted bail to two prominent rights activists, Vernon Gonsalves and Arun Ferreira, who have been jailed since 2018 in the Bhima Koregaon case. The court’s decision to grant bail to the two is interpreted as a refreshing revival of the Indian judiciary’s independence and values. But what is the Bhima Koregaon case?

The Bhima Koregaon case is a controversial and complex legal case that involves the arrests of several activists, academics, and political leaders for allegedly inciting caste violence and having links to Maoist rebels in India.

The origins of the case go back to the last day of 2017 when an event called called Elgaar Parishad was held in Pune, Maharashtra, to commemorate the 200th anniversary of the Battle of Koregaon-Bhima, where a small force of Dalit soldiers of the British East India Company defeated a larger army of the Peshwa, a Brahmin ruler. The event was attended by thousands of people, mostly Dalits, who consider the battle as a symbol of their resistance against caste oppression.

The event sparked off violence the next day, New Year’s Day 2018, when Dalit and upper-caste groups clashed near the Koregaon-Bhima war memorial. One person died and several were injured in the incident. The police filed an FIR against two right-wing leaders, Sambhaji Bhide and Milind Ekbote, for allegedly instigating the violence but no arrests were made.

Six months later, the Pune police arrested five activists, Sudhir Dhawale, Shoma Sen, Mahesh Raut, Rona Wilson, and Surendra Gadling, for allegedly having links to the banned Communist Party of India (Maoist) and for being part of a conspiracy to assassinate Prime Minister Narendra Modi. The police claimed that they had evidence from letters and documents seized from their computers and devices. The activists denied the charges and said that the evidence was fabricated.

A couple of months later, the police followed it up by raiding the homes of several other activists across the country and arrested five more, Varavara Rao, Vernon Gonsalves, Arun Ferreira, Sudha Bharadwaj, and Gautam Navlakha, on similar charges. They also alleged that these activists were involved in organising the Elgaar Parishad event and inciting violence at Bhima Koregaon.

In November 2018, the Bombay High Court rejected the bail pleas of the first five activists and extended their house arrest. In December 2018, the Supreme Court dismissed a petition seeking an independent probe into the case.

In January 2019, the Pune police filed a charge sheet against 10 of the accused, naming them as “urban Naxals” who were part of a larger conspiracy to overthrow the government and wage war against the country. The charge sheet also named nine more absconding accused, including some top Maoist leaders.

In February 2019, the Bombay High Court granted bail to Gautam Navlakha, but stayed his release for four weeks to allow the state to appeal. In March 2019, the Supreme Court set aside his bail order and directed him to surrender before the trial court.

In April 2019, the police filed a supplementary charge sheet against five more accused, 

In April 2019, the Pune police filed a supplementary charge sheet against five more accused, Anand Teltumbde, Stan Swamy, Hany Babu, Sagar Gorkhe, and Ramesh Gaichor.  

In January 2020, the then newly-formed Maharashtra government led by the Shiv Sena announced that it would review the case and consider dropping charges against some of the accused. However, in February 2020, the central government transferred the case to the National Investigation Agency (NIA), a federal agency that deals with terrorism-related cases.

In April 2020, amid the Covid-19 pandemic, several accused filed bail applications on medical grounds, citing their vulnerability to infection in prison. However, most of them were denied bail by various courts. In July 2020, Varavara Rao tested positive for Covid-19 and was shifted to a hospital. His family and lawyers alleged that he was not given proper medical care in prison and demanded his release on humanitarian grounds. In August 2020, he was granted interim bail for six months by the Bombay High Court on medical grounds.

The case of Stan Swamy, an 83-year-old Jesuit priest and tribal activist, stands out in particular for the insensitivity with which it was handled. Swamy was arrested by the NIA from his residence in Ranchi, Jharkhand in October 2020. Swamy, who suffered from Parkinson’s disease, was denied bail twice despite his fragile health condition.

In July 2021, Swamy died of a cardiac arrest in a hospital in Mumbai. He was 84 years old and had been on ventilator support for several days. His death sparked outrage and condemnation from various quarters, including the United Nations and the European Union. His lawyers and family accused the authorities of denying him proper medical care and violating his human rights.

Last week, the Supreme Court granted bail to Vernon Gonsalves and Arun Ferreira, two of the activists arrested in August 2018. They were both trade unionists and human rights defenders. The court noted that they had spent nearly five years in custody without trial and that mere accusations should not suffice as the sole basis for denying bail. The court imposed certain conditions on their bail, such as surrendering their passports, not leaving Maharashtra, and sharing their mobile location with the NIA.

As of now, out of the 23 arrested accused in the case, six have been granted bail (either interim or regular), one has died in custody, and 16 are still in jail awaiting trial. The trial is yet to begin as the charges are yet to be framed by the court. The case has been widely criticized as a witch-hunt against dissenting voices and an abuse of anti-terror laws by the state. The accused have maintained their innocence and claimed that they are being targeted for their work on behalf of marginalised communities and social justice causes.

If India and China Get Closer, What Would it Mean for the World?

In June this year, during Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to the US, the two countries signed the sort of defence agreements that the US usually reserves for its closest allies. One of the deals included in the agreements is a $3-billion one for 31 High Altitude Long Endurance (HALE) drones, of which the Navy will get 15 SeaGuardian drones. while the Army and the Indian Air Force (IAF) will get eight each of the SkyGuardian land version. The significance of these deals is not only that they enhance India’s defence capabilities but also demonstrate the degree of closeness between India and the US. 

The US has viewed India as a potential strategic ally and a counterbalance against the rising power of China with whom its relationship has been on a steady decline. It is a hope and strategy that has been pursued by the US since the Clinton regime. Since then regardless of whether it has been a Republican or a Democrat in the White House, the US has sought closer relations with India. The fact that India’s relations with China, have also been under strain, chiefly because of the long-drawn-out border dispute in the former’s north-eastern boundaries, has also united the two countries–with both having a sort of common enemy.

What if that changes? What if India and China manage to reach a rapprochement over the border and other disputes? 

On the face of it, it could seem premature to assume that could happen. After all, it has been barely three years since Indian and Chinese troops clashed at the border with India suffering more casualties than China. Both countries amassed more troops on the north-eastern side of India, the US offered high altitude combat gear and other assistance, and China enhanced its military infrastructure on the other side. The dispute also led to restrictions on trade, and bans on Chinese apps in India.

But is a detente now in the offing? Post-pandemic bilateral trade between India and China has grown more than 40%; and although the border dispute has not been resolved, after several rounds of negotiations, both sides have withdrawn some of their troops from each side.

Both India and China have much to gain from a more harmonious relationship between them. Trade, especially in technology inputs from China, and the vast market India offers to China whose economy is showing distinct signs of slowing, is important to both countries. A Symbiotic relationship between China and India could, in effect, lead to a greater bond between the two neighbours and, consequently, thwart the West’s (read:the US) attempts to gain stronger support of India as a counterfoil to China. 

True, these developments are still nascent but the US should take note that getting India as an ally is not going to be a cakewalk in an increasingly polarising geopolitical situation.

Should Modi Worry About INDIA, the Opposition Alliance?

A united opposition can be a potential threat to Narendra Modi, whose government has been in power since 2014 and has been able to marginalise most of its prominent political rivals, notably the Congress party whose current status is a faint shadow of what it was before 2014. 

After failing to stop the Modi-led juggernaut in elections–both at the Centre and in several states, India’s Opposition parties have now forged an alliance, Indian National Developmental Inclusive Alliance (INDIA) to challenge Modi and his BJP (Bharatiya Janata Party) in the next general election, which is due in May 2024. The alliance comprises 26 parties, including the main national opposition Congress party and several regional parties that have a strong base in some states.

The alliance claims to represent the interests of the people and the Constitution, and to oppose the “hatred and violence” that they allege Modi and his BJP have unleashed against minorities, especially Muslims, who make up about 14% of India’s population. The alliance also accuses Modi of undermining democracy, institutions, and federalism, and of mishandling the Covid-19 pandemic, the economy, and foreign policy.

But INDIA faces many challenges in taking on the current regime. Modi continues to be the most popular leader among the majority of Indians who are Hindus and make up 80% of the 1.4 billion population of the country. In an age where individual personalities play a significant role in politics, Modi has a charismatic personality, a strong media presence, and a loyal base of supporters who see him as a decisive and visionary leader who can deliver development and security for the country. Modi also has the advantage of being the undisputed leader of his party, while the opposition alliance has no clear leader or prime ministerial candidate.

Many believe that the Opposition alliance is potentially riven by internal differences and contradictions. It is a union of disparate ideologies and interest groups that are united only because they are all opposed to the Modi regime. Such a basis for an alliance can be fraught with risks of fractures and, indeed, a collapse. 

Many in the alliance are rivals or enemies in their respective states, and some of them have been allies or partners of the BJP in the past. The alliance will have to find a common minimum program that can appeal to voters across regions, castes, religions, and classes.

INDIA will also have to contend with the BJP’s formidable electoral machine, which has a huge network of workers, volunteers, and resources. The BJP also has the support of several influential groups, such as the RSS (Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh), a Hindu nationalist organization that is the ideological mentor of the BJP; the VHP (Vishva Hindu Parishad), a Hindu right-wing group that campaigns for Hindu causes; and various media outlets that are sympathetic or loyal to the BJP.

The alliance will also have to face the challenges posed by the electoral system, which is based on first-past-the-post voting. This means that even if the alliance gets more votes than the BJP nationally, it may not get more seats in parliament if it loses in key states or constituencies where the BJP has a strong presence or advantage. Seat-sharing strategies will be important for winning in the elections and these, for parties that have often been at loggerheads with each other, can be difficult to forge. 

Then there is the question of defections and splits. Political alliances in India have also been marked by instances of sabotage from within. Also, the BJP can attempt to lure away key members of the alliance with the offer of lucrative political deals that capitalise on individual ambitions or lust for power. 

In theory, a united opposition is probably the only way to challenge the monolithic and powerful regime that Modi has in place but in practice it is not going to be easy. Which way voters cast their ballots will depend on how they assess the performance of the Modi government, which will have completed 10 years by the time the elections are held. It will also depend on campaign strategies of either side and, of course, on any unforeseen developments that could change the narrative.

India’s Economy is Growing Fast But That isn’t Enough

India’s economy is one of the fastest-growing and largest in the world, but it also faces many challenges and uncertainties. According to the World Bank, India’s GDP growth rate was 8.3% in 2022, making it the fifth-largest economy by nominal GDP. However, the IMF projects that India’s growth will slow down to 6.9% in 2023 and 6.5% in 2024, due to the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic, the weakness of the financial sector, and the slowdown in global trade.

Some of the main drivers of India’s economic growth are its large and young population, its urbanisation and digitalisation, its reforms and investments in infrastructure, and its integration with global markets. Some of the main pitfalls that India’s economy faces are its high poverty and inequality, its environmental and social sustainability, its institutional and governance quality, and its geopolitical and security risks.

Therefore, India’s economic prospects depend on how well it can balance its opportunities and challenges, and how resilient and adaptable it can be in the face of shocks and uncertainties. India needs to pursue a more inclusive, sustainable, and job-rich growth model that can benefit all its people and regions, while also enhancing its competitiveness and innovation in the global arena.

Why Oppenheimer Doing Better than Barbie in India

In India, some things can often be counter-intuitive. That could be the case in the box-office performance of two potential blockbuster Hollywood movies that hit the screens together at the end of July.

Based on available information, globally it seems that the Barbie movie has been more successful than the Oppenheimer movie, at least so far. The Barbie movie, which stars Margot Robbie and Ryan Gosling as the iconic dolls, and is directed by Greta Gerwig, opened on July 21, 2023 to rave reviews and record-breaking box office numbers. According to various sources, the Barbie movie made over $500 million worldwide in its first week, and was expected to cross $700 million by its second weekend. Some analysts predict that the Barbie movie will soon reach $1 billion worldwide, making it one of the biggest hits of the year.

The Oppenheimer movie, which stars Cillian Murphy as the father of the atomic bomb, and is directed by Christopher Nolan, opened on the same day as the Barbie movie, but had a lower profile and a smaller budget. The Oppenheimer movie also received positive reviews and impressive box office results, but not as much as the Barbie movie. According to various sources, the Oppenheimer movie made about $180 million worldwide in its first week, and was expected to reach $300 million by its second weekend. Some analysts predict that the Oppenheimer movie will end up with around $500 million worldwide, making it a profitable and acclaimed film, but not a blockbuster.

But let’s cut to India, where things seem to be quite different. After it was released on the same date as everywhere else in the world, the Barbie film grossed nearly Rs 39 crore in the first 10 days in India. But Oppenheimer, released simultaneously with Barbie,  has soared ahead of the global blockbuster. The film’s total gross collections are nearly Rs 78 crore.

Is that surprising? Perhaps not. Barbie is a fashion doll created in 1959, manufactured and marketed by the toy giant Mattel. It became a worldwide franchise worth millions of dollars and swept the market for decades. However, in India the Barbie brand resonates with a tiny percentage of affluent, western-influenced households. 

In contrast, the interest in Oppenheimer, which is about the father of the most devastating invention of modern weaponry, resonates with many more Indians than a blonde doll with an improbable physique does. 

India’s Role in US Defence Strategy

The latest U.S. Defence Strategy states that China presents the most consequential and systemic challenge, while Russia poses acute threats to vital U.S. national interests abroad and to the homeland.

“The world is changing. We’re at a significant inflection point in world history. And our country and the world – the United States of America has always been able to chart the future in times of great change. We’ve been able to constantly renew ourselves. And time and again, we’ve proven there’s not a single thing we cannot do as a nation when we do it together – and I mean that – not a single solitary thing.” President Biden stated in the introductory note to the strategy.

U.S. Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin highlighted the different challenges posed by China and Russia as he unveiled the strategy. According to him the dangers are both conventional – Moscow’s aggression toward its neighbours and Beijing’s efforts to gain control of Taiwan – and nuclear, with Russia possessing an extensive arsenal and China’s stocks of atomic weapons growing fast. The strategy likewise places the primary emphasis on China.

It further asserts that Beijing is seeking to “refashion the Indo-Pacific region and the international system to suit its interests and authoritarian preferences,” describing this dynamic as “the most comprehensive and serious challenge to US national security.”

The strategy says Chinese rhetoric about and “coercive activity” toward Taiwan – which Beijing has vowed to take control of, by force if necessary – is a destabilising factor that risks miscalculation and threatens peace in the area. As for Russia, it says the “acute threat” posed by Moscow has been most recently demonstrated by Moscow’s February attacks on Ukraine.

Though the strategy tries to portray the U.S. ties in the Indo-Pacific as the most important one, yet India as a whole is mentioned in the strategy only five times and that too in the context of the Indo-Pacific, and there too it refers to China’s campaigns to establish control over the East China Sea, Taiwan Strait, South China Sea, and disputed land borders such as with India.

It proclaims to promote a free and open Indo-Pacific, which could only be achieved if the U.S. builds collective capacity with other countries, like India. It further asserts that no region will be of more significance to the world and to everyday Americans than the Indo-Pacific, yet it fails to demonstrate India’s importance to achieve this goal as a partner.

The document lists out the U.S. Vision, U.S.’s role in the global arena, and an overview of its strategic approach to different regional issues. Focussing on Middle East, the strategy talks about tweaking its policy in the Middle East and North Africa by eschewing grand designs in favour of more practical steps that can advance U.S. interests and help regional partners lay the foundation for greater stability, prosperity, and opportunity for the people of the Middle East and for the American people.

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The strategy sets forth a new framework for U.S. policy in the region based on America’s unparalleled comparative advantage in building partnerships, coalitions, and alliances to strengthen deterrence, while using diplomacy to de-escalate tensions, reduce risks of new conflicts, and set a long-term foundation for stability.

However, it clearly states that the United States will not allow foreign or regional powers to jeopardise freedom of navigation through the Middle East’s waterways, including the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab al Mandab, nor tolerate efforts by any country to dominate another – or the region – through military build-ups, incursions, or threats.

But if we scrutinise the strategy in a little more detail then we realise the emerging contradictions present in the strategy. When the strategy declares the U.S. commitment to support countries “that subscribe to the rules-based international order”, will it include those OPEC countries which recently snubbed the U.S. demands for increased oil production?

When it talks about “military build-ups” then does it really mean that the U.S.  will halt its longstanding efforts to advance its partners’ “military build-ups” in the face of the threat from Iran? Further, how could the U.S. achieve the Israeli “dominance” of Hamas and Hezbollah?

Further, the strategy lays stress on U.S. diplomacy to reduce tensions “wherever possible” – will it translate into normalising ties with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, or meeting with Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah?

All this double talk on various regional and global issues and inherent contradictions of the strategy leads on to surmise that it is more of a document to placate the American public and not aimed at really achieving or changing substantially the U.S. policies on these issues. Overall the National Security Strategy 2022 comes out as a bit of a disappointment though perhaps packaged coherently for the first time.

India, China Must Get Out Of Geopolitics Trap: Outgoing Envoy

Sun Weidong, the outgoing Chinese Ambassador to India on Tuesday highlighted the profound ties and common ground between China and India.

In his farewell statement, he said, “We should break out of the ‘geopolitics trap’ and find a new path that is different from the past. There is enough room in the world for China and India to develop together, and the two countries and peoples should have enough wisdom to find a way to live in peace and achieve win-win cooperation between the two big neighbouring and emerging countries.”

Sun further elaborated that if the Western theory of geopolitics is applied to the China-India relationship, then major neighbouring countries will inevitably view each other as threats and rivals.

“Consequently, competition and confrontation will be the main mode of interaction, and a zero-sum game will be the inevitable result. But the reality is that geographical proximity is an objective existence. It should be an opportunity for us to have more interaction and cooperation, tap our potential and learn from and complement each other. If we view it as a kind of bad fate, it will make us suspect and undercut each other, compete and confront with each other, or even become rivals,” said the outgoing Chinese envoy.

He urged China and India to make the right choice and contribute to peace and development in the region and beyond.

Speaking about the dialogue mechanism between the two countries, he said, “We should make full use of all the communication channels, and deepen mutual understanding in order to avoid misunderstanding and miscalculation.”

Notably, China optimized the visa application process for Indian citizens to travel to China and resumed processing visa applications for students pursuing long-term study, and people conducting business, work and family visits.

Up to now, more than 1,800 visas have been issued to Indian students. Sun hoped that there would be more and more exchange of visits.

Stressing the importance of managing and resolving differences between the two nations, he said, “We should seek common ground while reserving differences and properly handle the differences. China and India are important neighbours of each other. It is only natural for China and India to have some differences. The key is how to handle the differences. We should be aware that the common interests of the two countries are greater than the differences. Meanwhile, the two sides should strive to manage and resolve differences, and look for a proper solution through dialogue and consultation, instead of defining China-India relations by differences.”

Sharing his experience in India during his tenure as Chinese Ambassador to India, he said, “The past 3 years and 3 months have been an unforgettable period in my life. On the occasion of my departure, I would like to express my most heartfelt appreciation to all my friends for your care for China’s development and support to the cause of China-India friendship, and to friends for your support and assistance to me in the performance of my duties.”

Sun said that through joint efforts of both sides, China and India can bring back relations on the right track and urged to promote the sound and steady development of bilateral ties to deliver benefits to the two countries. (ANI)

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Indian Sports And Chinese Games

The Indian athletes at the forthcoming Tokyo Olympics will be seen wearing ‘unbranded’ sports apparel. No more Chinese designs, logos and sponsorship. With this symbolic, globally visible (since it will be visuals-only games) parting of ways with the hostile neighbour, India has also joined the global China-versus-the United States game, on the latter’s side.

The change has come after last year’s military skirmishes on the disputed border. The Indian Olympic Association has suspended its collaboration with Chinese giant Li Ning that kitted the Indian athletes and sponsored their travel. This was being done, the IOA said, to respect “sentiments of the people of the country.”

Prior to the border incidents, then sports minister Kiren Rijiju, incidentally a Member of Parliament from Arunachal Pradesh that China claims as its territory, had said: “Li Ning designed the official sports kit inspired by India’s national colours and integrated unique graphics to emote the energy and pride of the Indian Olympic Team.”

The deal was reported to be worth INR 50 million. Li Ning was the Indian team’s apparel sponsor at the Rio Olympics five years ago and had also provided uniforms for the 2018 Commonwealth and Asian Games.

Tokyo Games big medal hopeful, shuttler PV Sindhu, was also sponsored by Li Ning. All that is over, at least for now. Last year, till the border incidents, Vivo, the telecom giant had sponsored India Premier League, the multi-million cricketing tournament. It returned briefly this year, apparently due to some contract obligations.

India relies heavily on products and raw materials from China in nearly every sport. According to the Department of Commerce’s data for 2018-2019, over half of India’s sports equipment was imported from China. This includes ­footballs to table tennis balls and shuttlecocks, tennis and badminton racquets and their stringing machines, mountain climbing and adventure sports gear, gym apparatus and athletics gear including javelins and high jump bars.

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Forget the no-politics-in-sports idea. Popular sentiments over the ‘betrayal’ on the border should have triggered a “boycott Chinese goods” campaign. But Prime Minister Modi’s government, keen on taking political credit, does not wish to stir the economic and trade cauldron.

This is not child’s play. The global toy market is about $100 billion, but as Modi lamented at the recent “Toycathon”, urging Indian toymakers to be ‘atmanirbhar’ (self-reliant) in making toys for children, that India’s share is only around $1.5 billion. Worse, “we import about 80 percent of our toys,” and worse still (which he didn’t say), 70 percent of this 80 percent come from China.

India is ‘critically dependent’ on China in imports across 86 tariff lines, a Group of Ministers (GoM) reported last December. Line items include consumer electronics, computer hardware, telephone equipment, electronic items, and air conditioners and refrigerators. Also, China has the largest share in India’s imports — more than 18 per cent in April-September 2020. This share has risen since, despite the border incidents and despite the pandemic, as China, unlike India, has managed to curb the spread of Covid-19 and kept its factories running.

The Indian authorities have banned a hundred Chinese apps and more are in the pipeline.  Only, the Chinese presence in India’s market – name any product – remains heavy, a fact of everyday life. Two-way trade in 2020 reached $87.6 billion, down by 5.6 percent, the trade deficit declined to a five year-low of $45.8 billion. “The trade deficit is not in dollars, it is in overdependence,” Sanjay Chadha, Additional Secretary in the Ministry of Commerce and Industry said in January.

Cell-phone has fully integrated into an Indian’s life. Visit any home or market place and see how Chinese brands dominate. They commanded 75 percent of India’s smartphone market in 2020, up from 71 percent in 2019. Given their spread, pushing Germans, French, South Koreans among others to the margins of a growing market, it is doubtful if India’s online education of millions of students, compelled by Covid-19, would have been possible.

Cell-phone is just one example. Computers and other communications gadgets and apps are hugely Chinese. Fear of a possible suspension of Chinese tech-support for their maintenance persists. Keen to avoid any such problem in future, this writer purchased a Taiwanese brand laptop last year, only to find that it was “Made in China” under Taiwanese licence.

It is no consolation that the US itself is having to urge its own basketball stars to shun Li Ning sports products because the Chinese giant is said to be using cotton sourced from its Xinjiang region where the authorities are accused of suppressing minority Muslims. Incidentally, in a tit-for-tat, Li Ning had itself suspended cooperation with the Americans earlier, “in national interests”, after American producers backed the anti-Beijing protests in Hong Kong.

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The Indian story is similar to many countries. Only, not everyone has a disputed border with China. Neither is there nudging from a strategic partner like the United States to ‘balance’ the Asian scene. In a sense, India pays double price when it cannot deal with erstwhile ally Russia, Iran or anyone the US dislikes.

India’s case remains unique for several reasons. Besides a border that gets ‘live’ from time to time, and talks have made little headway in the last six decades, it has reasons to feel ‘surrounded.’ The Himalayan ranges became pregnable in the last century.  For long years, one debated on the “string of Pearls”, of China developing military bases on islands all around the Indian Ocean. The region was for long ‘Indian’ — its backyard, in broad maritime terms – no longer so.

This is old story. The Chinese deep pockets have won over just all of India’s neighbours after China formally launched the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). All South Asians have joined in, with varying outcome, but with bright hope of the Chinese money and technology being available — for a price. India is the sole ‘outsider’. Its pockets are not deep, nor has it established a good record of completing projects in its neighbourhood, yielding space to China.

For long years, there was a quiet pride that India and China managed well their economic and trade ties, despite an unsolved border dispute. It was called pragmatism and was contrasted with India-Pakistan, wherein the trade was restricted due to mistrust. India would show the Chinese example and accuse Pakistan of being cussed. While that remains, the China story has taken a beating. This is unlikely to normalise for long.  

The conflict-from-cradle rivalry with Pakistan has taken India miles ahead of the recalcitrant neighbour. But even that is now becoming thin. China has taken resolute striders in Pakistan in the shape of China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), investing billions in building infrastructure that Pakistan could never dream of despite its decades of alliance with the West – the US in particular. Now, China, the “iron brother”, is helping out, in return for entry to the Indian Ocean. Now, the two are about to extend their collaboration, howsoever unequal and weighed in China’s favour, to a land-locked Afghanistan. Whether or not Pakistan gains “strategic depth” against India in future, a government in Kabul that may not be hospitable to India, with this extension of CPEC bears the potential of giving it “economic depth.”

Call it “Chinese East India Company”, or talk of the inevitable debt trap – who cares? In the next decade, China will have laid infrastructure that is as good, or even better than, India, across South Asia. And its CPEC will have created a significant class or rich politicians and civil and military officials in Pakistan who can, supported by military and economic heft from China, can afford to stare down at India.

The writer can be reached at mahendraved07@gmail.com

Return To Status Quo Ante On Tibet Govt In Exile

A few weeks ago, in a sober and low-key ceremony on account of the pervasive and raging Wuhan Virus, Penpa Tsering was sworn in as the democratically elected Sikyong or the President of the Dharamshala based Central Tibetan Administration (CTA), the Tibetan government in exile.

From the time results of the elections were declared in mid-April 2021 to the swearing-in ceremony on May 27 and even thereafter, messages of felicitations have poured in from parliamentarians across the world, Tibet support groups, international bodies and institutions. Notably, the US State Department, parliamentarians from EU countries, Canada and from Japan and Australia – 3 of the 4 Quad member countries- and Taiwan’s Foreign Minister sent congratulatory messages to the new Sikyong.

However, there was no official media reportage on the election, the swearing-in ceremony, or message of felicitation to the new democratically elected Sikyong from political leaders, officials or organizations affiliated to the Indian government.

The conspicuous silence is evidently in line with the classified directive issued by GOI in a letter dated Feb 22, 2018 that was circulated to all offices in the Central and State governments. The letter imposed restrictions in the form of an “advisory” to all Ministries/Departments of the Government of India as well as State Governments not to accept any invitation or participate in any function organized or hosted by the CTA. It was issued on the eve of the then Foreign Secretary’s visit to China citing the reason to be a “very sensitive time in India-China relations”.

Speculations on the underlying reasons for the issue of the referred letter made by a stunned CTA, Tibetan community in exile and many China/Tibet experts varied.

Some believed that it was a condition to pave the way for Prime Minister Narendra Modi – President Xi Summit in Wuhan that followed in April 2018.

Some said that it was to persuade the Chinese to change their position on Masood Azhar being listed as a terrorist by the UN.

A few opined that it was to get China’s nod on India’s membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

One assessment suggested that it could have been a mere pique at the undisclosed visit of a senior representative from the Dalai Lama set up to China ostensibly as part of their back-channel negotiations for the resumption of dialogue between the two sides.

Whatever the considerations at that time were, the revised policy guidelines were in line with India’s genuine desire to continue to build on the goodwill generated during Xi’s parleys with PM Modi in Ahmedabad. It was a significant step taken by India to bridge the “trust deficit” coming in the way of improvement in bilateral relations.

However, India’s efforts to build mutual trust were brutally undermined in May 2020 by the pre-meditated and brazen display of deceit and deception when an aggressive and expansionist China diverted troops to occupy territory previously not under its control in Eastern Ladakh.

It blatantly violated painstakingly negotiated bilateral agreements, confidence-building measures, protocols and understandings. The “trust deficit” which India sought to bridge actually widened due to Chinese duplicity.

Meanwhile, the international situation has also undergone significant changes. The Biden Administration has signalled its inclination to abide by the Tibet Policy and Support Act.

It made an unprecedented gesture in publicly extending greetings to the CTA on the occasion of the Tibetan New Year. It has indicated a steady and firm resolve to reconfigure its relations with China to one of “strategic competition”.

China is viewed as being bent on disrupting and defying the rules-based international order and threatening peace and stability. The Quad has galvanized. The EU has frozen a massive investment agreement with China.

Internal repression in China is getting more focus than ever in the recent past. Tibet, Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia, Hong Kong and Taiwan are gradually gaining renewed global attention for a variety of political and strategic reasons.

Under these circumstances, an urgent need is felt for a substantive reappraisal of India’s relations with China across the board and with Tibet in particular.

Many ideas have been mooted in the strategic community as a befitting political riposte. These range from India abandoning the One China policy, to awarding the Dalai Lama with the highest civilian honour, to the Indian government expressing support for all the decisions taken by the Dalai Lama in the matter of his reincarnation, to welcoming the 15th Dalai Lama as an honoured guest of India.

While all such suggestions can be discussed on their merit and efficacy, the lowest hanging fruit is the quiet unpublicized burial of the February 22, 2018 directive and return to status quo ante in relation to interaction with the CTA as it prevailed since 2011.

At that time, in an astute and far-sighted move, the Dalai Lama approved the devolution of all the administrative and political powers vested in him to democratically elected Tibetan leaders.

The Government of India viewed this in a positive light. The former Sikyong, Lobsang Sangay, was invited to attend PM Modi’s oath-taking ceremony in May 2014 along with other Heads of Government.

Contacts and interaction with the Dalai Lama and Sikyong at the highest political levels, albeit unofficial, continued. This was despite China conveying her objections to India for permitting the CTA to carry out their legitimate functions and pursuit of religious activities.

A return to the pre-February 22, 2018 policy will send the right signal about India’s determination to shun any notion of appeasement in its relations with China as the latter continues to play hardball on border negotiations.

It will be a small but significant step to bring the Tibet issue back on the table. It will have the desired effect in the Tibetan community in exile and within Tibet in the form of tacit support to the CTA’s international advocacy efforts to resume Sino-Tibet negotiations. It will also indicate India’s willingness to join the call from the wider comity of democratic countries in this respect.

The time to shed any perceived ambivalence on the Tibet issue is now. The time to restore the status quo ante on India’s policy towards the CTA, and the Tibetan community is here.

(The author is former Special Secretary, Government of India, Cabinet Secretariat – ANI)