Afghanistan: US Won, West Lost; Pak Profited, India Adrift

The United States attacked Afghanistan to achieve some specific objectives including: 1) Kill Osama bin Laden; 2) topple Taliban regime and install a cooperative Afghan government; and 3) establish influence in the region.

The withdrawal of the US after a 20-year war under NATO banner has led to many interpretations. All different positions appear to be supported by good arguments. Many see it as a failure and defeat. Others fear that the region will become a nest-bed for ‘terrorists’ again. However, it seems that the US entered Afghanistan with a broader plan and it achieved all its objectives despite these contradictory statements even by some eminent people. Pakistan and Iran appear to have benefitted while it seems India may have been left adrift without friends in the region.

The conflicting narratives whether the United States won or lost emerge under three types of human activity and nature:

  1. Sensitive individuals adopt independent approach towards specific situations or outcomes either because of the facts that they know or because they don’t compromise on their integrity. There are many examples of people who repent after wars and have written stories of the miseries of people under attack.
  2. The western world enjoys freedom of expression and therefore opinion writers get full benefit of independence to express their own stance irrespective of the government’s reservations.
  3. According to conspiracy theory, sometimes a few individuals are planted by the secret agencies themselves to create a debate going against the national narrative to create confusion.

When the US toppled the Taliban government without any reasonable resistance, the circumstances further encouraged and facilitated the US to influence the regional geo-strategic overture in its favour. It influenced the shape of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline project, and other regional issues

The USA planned to counter China’s increasing influence in Pakistan, Iran, Afghanistan and Central Asia. Therefore US designs were manifold and a very prudent policy was required to achieve all these objectives.

While the USA was pursuing its policy, India had become somewhat optimist and was obstructing Pakistan by establishing its bases within Afghanistan and promoting militancy in the western and central areas of Pakistan. Pakistan seemed to be squeezed down to a nonentity. However, India’s policy would appear to have been somewhat irrational as it failed to consider deeper natural relationships based on racial, religious, territorial and political bonds. These seemed to have been overlooked by both Indian and US policymakers.

Pakistan took counter initiatives to survive through this period. It cooperated with the international community and took measure against terrorism and extremism in the region. Pakistan opened the Kartarpur Corridor and even sought significant changes in the education syllabus as desired by the minorities living in Pakistan. Laws regarding religious matters of the minorities were introduced to boost up their sense of integration and respect in the society.

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Pakistan remained with the international community despite an aggressive Indian policy against Pakistan and huge investment in Afghanistan. The Indian government opened its educational institutions for Afghan students. India set up training camps in different cities of Afghanistan and infused anti-Pakistan sentiments which damaged peace in KPK, Baluchistan and Punjab.

In all this, the United States however had a parallel policy while India seems to have put all its eggs in one basket or approach.

Consequently, the fall of Ashraf Ghani’s government and the recapture of Kabul by the Taliban has been devastating for the BJP government. BJP underestimated the sanctity and strategic importance of ‘neighbourhood’ despite facing its practical implications when interfering within the internal affairs of their small neighbouring countries.

Despite all odds and lapses, the stark reality is that Pakistan and Afghanistan cannot be separated, being neighbours and racially and religiously connected. This dimension also explains why BJP government failed in its Middle East policy. It has had to bear loss of close neighbourhood ties with Iran, Afghanistan, China and Pakistan. The Taliban’s declaration to support the Kashmiri Muslims has further stamped the failure of the BJP policy in Afghanistan.

On the other hand, as far as the US is concerned, it has won the war because it achieved its objectives and moved ahead with a well worked out policy. The USA killed Osama Bin Laden, toppled a hostile Taliban government, damaged CPEC and influenced Iran, Afghan groups, Pakistan, China and other countries. It deftly and  simultaneously carried on its aggressive activities as well as backdoor diplomacy with Taliban. This strategy not only maintained US terror on the Afghans but also encouraged them to reach an agreement with the US.

US policymakers seemed clear about the impotency of the Afghans but on the other hand they were also aware of the religious potency and might of Taliban. Therefore through backdoor diplomacy Americans settled all issues with Taliban and left as promised in August 2021. What these promises are will become clearer in the next few years. The new Taliban is a much different Taliban in that it seems amenable to American ‘friendship’.

During the last 20 years, Taliban forces did not face any kind of scarcity of modern weapons, food, technology and backdoor channel diplomacy. The West can best reveal from where Taliban were being facilitated.

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The US appears to have won because it got its objectives and evacuated its armies. It also got promises from Taliban to respect international pressure and UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The Taliban also assured that Afghanistan would not let terrorists act against US and its allies. It is most likely that the US has also got assurances from Taliban to curtail if not stop the drug trade.

The US will now be able to balance its finances that were being drained in Afghanistan and instead concentrate on other interests and threats. Many wrote critical opinions and gave speeches criticizing the abrupt and unannounced departure of the US army from Afghanistan. They have deemed it an utter and humiliating defeat of the US. Yet the US showed its military might by reappearing in Afghanistan at will to evacuate its ambassadorial staff and other personnel. How many defeated armies are able to go back unhindered and recover their people, even with the cooperation of so called winners! Commentators seem to miss this point. This is clearly not a black and white win or loser scenario.

If Taliban fulfil all the promises, it will be a victory for the US, Pakistan, Iran and the region. Therefore the reemergence of Taliban with the help of the US and with consent of Pakistan and Iran affirms the success and very smart policy of the United States who managed it all behind the curtain. The US has killed thousands of Afghans. Despite that, the Taliban have desired to have cordial relations with them because common sense guides that all international forums, institutions and aggressive as well as peace diplomacy revolve around the US.

China cannot counter the US because both have different domains in world politics. China penetrates through commercial designs and modes while US asserts through aggressive diplomacy. Therefore, there is possibility or competition of a US-China conflict in contrast to the previous US-Soviet Union cold and proxy wars. The Soviet was ideologically competing with the US for dominance.

China is not interested in ideological competition. This confirms the US as an unchallengeable might in the battlefield while China has no match in the economic sphere. China as world power has UN veto and enjoys high and influential stature as an effective world player

The US ties with India are important but the recent developments in Afghanistan, especially engineered by the US, appear to show no favours or gains for India. It is highly unlikely that India knew of America’s deeper and secretive policies. It seems it may have been caught unaware and on a backfoot.

The withdrawal of the US from Afghanistan and agreement with Taliban is a wise decision as it has achieved all of American strategic goals. Its influence remains and it still marshals events in the region. Unfortunately, India may be the only looser in the Afghan game while Iran and Pakistan will gain special role in the coming years in the region.

Taliban Victory Puts Pakistan In A Spot

Pakistani government at the moment seems to be in a quandary. The manner in which it wanted to exploit the Taliban victory in Afghanistan has rebounded threatening to reinforce religious fundamentalists inclinations in Pakistan itself. US President Joe Biden’s decision to withdraw American forces from Afghanistan was due to the realisation that religious fundamentalism might not remain contained to Afghanistan.

The Taliban’s victory in Afghanistan may give Pakistan a choice to look at its relationships with its neighbours, not just from an anti-India stance as it tries to rein-in and influence Taliban to remain pro-Pakistan and not adopt an independent policy of their own.

However, the religio-politico situation of the region which started rearing its head in 1980s with the help of US and Saudi-backed fanatical elements to drive out the Soviets from Afghanistan, has increasingly showed ripple effect in Pakistan, the Tehrik-e Taliban-e Pakistan (TTP) remains a prime example of such thinking.

Pakistan is seen as working in support of the Taliban as reports suggest that it was based on the advice of Pakistani military and government officials that the US generals stuck to the Taliban’s August 31 deadline for an end to US evacuation so that the group can move forward with forming a government.

In fact the Pakistani military started working on efforts to persuade the United States to negotiate an end to the war with the Taliban even before they gained control of Afghanistan, a development Pakistani officers believed was inevitable. Based on those inputs the US started to engage with Taliban in early 2019.

Commenting on the evolving situation Ayesha Siddiqa a geo-politics adviser at SOAS, UK said that Rawalpindi invested primarily in the Taliban as it knew that US would ultimately leave Afghanistan. Rawalpindi’s prime desire was to ensure a friendly establishment in its north-western neighbouring nation, which doesn’t get exploited against Pakistan’s interests, especially by India.

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However, the investment over 27 years has produced mixed results. It certainly did not translate into the Taliban doing Pakistan’s bidding. Ms. Siddiqa described Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid’s promise that Afghan media would be free as “a reminder of similar assurances about media freedom by Pakistan’s generals, which makes one realise the effort afoot to make a Taliban-led regime look increasingly like Pakistan (or even India): Hybrid-authoritarian and hybrid-theocratic… This is where the real problem for Pakistan begins.”

While Pakistani fears that the Taliban victory may give a violent boost to the TTP, the Pakistani Taliban that has close ties to their Afghan kin, the TTP had started to be active again inside Pakistan even before the Taliban capture of Afghanistan.

The Taliban victory benefits from decades in which religious fundamentalism was woven into the fabric of Pakistani society as well as some of its key institutions.

Ms. Siddiqa comments, “The fact remains that, notwithstanding the ambition to mellow the tone of religion in Afghanistan, Pakistan itself runs the risk of becoming more like its north-western neighbour – more religious and more authoritarian.”

Pakistan understands the complex situation very well and that’s why it was pushing the Taliban to opt for a truly inclusive government besides broadening its contacts with other Afghan groups. A visit last week to the Pakistani capital by representatives of the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance and other Afghan politicians is a pointer in that regard.

In discussing the fallout for Pakistan of the Taliban victory, analysts have by and large focussed on Pakistan as fertile ground for the spread of Taliban-style religious fundamentalism as well as concerns that it would enable TTP to rekindle their campaign of attacks in Pakistan.

The TTP is a coalition of Pashtun Islamist groups with close ties to the Afghan Taliban that last year joined forces with several other militant Pakistani groups, including Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, a violently anti-Shiite Sunni Muslim supremacist organisation.

“Pashtuns of the Afghan Taliban will, after a few years in power, find common cause with their Pashtun kinsmen in Pakistan… There are plenty of Pakistani Pashtuns who would prefer the whole of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (formerly North-West Frontier Province) to be part of a wider Pashtunistan,” predicts scholar and former British ambassador to Pakistan Tim Willasey-Wilsey.

In fact, the events of the last 75 years confirm that the main focus of Pakistan’s foreign policy has always been anti-Indian in tenor and practice. It became a fertile ground for Mujahedeen in the 1970s, as it wanted to exert more influence on the Soviet state as compared to India besides stoking fire in Indian Kashmir.

Later it allied with the US just in order to belittle India, but the reality is that Pakistan has always tried to be involved in the Afghan affairs due to the economic gains also and this trend continues even now. The British Foreign Secretary Dominic Rabb, while in Pakistan last week, announced doubling of aid to Afghanistan to £286 million and released the first tranche of  £30 million of that to support Afghanistan’s regional neighbours including Pakistan. Thus, in a way the foreign aid has not only lined the pockets of Afghan gang lords and politicians but even the Pakistani generals and politicians.

Due to this complexity in the Afghan affairs and the recent announcements by senior Taliban leadership with regard to India puts Pakistan in a real quandary. Pakistan might also be concerned after a Taliban official Sher Mohammed Abbas Stanekzai declared in a rare statement on foreign policy that “we give due importance to our political, economic and trade ties with India and we want these ties to continue. We are looking forward to working with India in this regard.”

Stanekzai is considered to have a soft corner for India, having trained at IMA, Dehradun during the 1980s, and it is Taliban officials like him and others who might be more pro-India, which puts Pakistan at unease along with the concern that one day the Taliban style thinking might spread through Pakistan also.

(Asad Mirza is a political commentator based in New Delhi. He writes on issues related to Muslims, education, geopolitics and interfaith)

Taliban In Kabul: India’s Diplomatic Challenge

Next-door to India, a regional event with global implications that is dreaded by all, whether in support or opposition, is happening. Well-armed and highly motivated, the Taliban are overrunning Afghanistan, fighting pitched territorial battles with the government forces, pushing them out of the vast countryside and confining them to the cities.

It may be a matter of weeks before the government in Kabul collapses because the political and military will of the world powers has also collapsed. There seems to be room only for diplomacy as war-weary US-Nato withdraw their soldiers, a process they may complete well before the September 11 deadline.

The Taliban appear unstoppable. They couldn’t care less what the world thinks of them. They are focused totally on regaining power and their own national issues. A recent interview a top Taliban leader gave ‘Foreign Policy’ reiterates their well-known and much-criticised approach to their women. There will be little education and no jobs for them once they return to power.

The Taliban calculate that the world will worship the victor. After all, they have huge untapped minerals to offer. Weren’t they, when in power, wooed for access and exploitation of Central Asia’s gas an oil – till 9/11 happened?

But the dread persists and it is not just due to uncertainties of what may lie ahead. The nations that are withdrawing from a war they cannot win after nearly two decades are frightened of terrorism in the shape of Al Qaida and the Islamic State returning to Afghanistan, along with and even without the Taliban at the helm. The extremist forces they created and battled by turns as per their expediency have acquired strength they cannot control. It’s déjà vu.

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This is most apparent in the Biden administration that had little choice – and inclination – to undo what the previous Trump administration handed down. Biden’s Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin says Al Qaeda could regroup in Afghanistan in two years.  Gen. Mark Milley, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and a veteran of the war in Afghanistan, told the US Senate Appropriations Committee that he agreed. It was the most specific public forecast of the prospects for a renewed international terrorist threat from Afghanistan since President Joe Biden announced in April that all U.S. troops would withdraw by September 11.

If America fears this even as it withdraws, unconditionally and completely, the France-based think tank, Center for the Analysis of Terrorism (CAT), in a paper published this month sees resurgence of Al Qaida, the IS and its numerous affiliates across a vast region that covers West, Central and South Asia as  result of the forthcoming tectonic changes in Afghanistan.  

The title and the focus are “the Pakistani Jihadis and Global Jihad” which India can hardly afford to ignore. It says, “…following the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, one is likely to witness a resurgence of the Taliban and probably a more operational coordination between Pakistan-supported groups like the LET & JEM and the Taliban.”

It further says: “The current threat landscape and its evolution is strongly tied to the evolution, transformation and fragmentation of historical organizations active in the region since the late 80s and to the continuing alignment of political organs and elites’ interests in Pakistan with those of the Pakistani jihadi organizations (for example the annexation of Jammu and Kashmir), whilst several of these organizations have since adhered to the global agenda of terrorist organizations posing a direct threat to neighbouring countries, primarily India.”

Is it surprising that Pakistan castigates India as a ‘spoiler’ in Afghanistan for trying to deny the strategic advantage it hopes to gain, post-US withdrawal, from a new regime in Kabul? But Pakistan has own set of Cassandras to deal with in the shape of more refugees, more drugs and more sectarian violence. TTP, the Pakistani Taliban have the same ideological inclination as the Afghan Taliban they have hosted for two decades. 

The situation is unenviable for India that sees repeat of its recent past. It was friendless when the Russians withdrew and the regime they had supported collapsed. It stands to become friendless again with a Taliban rise, this time having invested over USD three billion.  

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India has little choice but to engage with the Taliban, and whoever else gains powers after the US-led evacuation. Indeed, its growing proximity to the US makes its presence more vulnerable from the very people it has opposed and criticised. The memories of the 1999 hijack of an Indian passenger aircraft to Kandahar are fresh and so are attacks on its interests by the Haqqani group, said to be working for Pakistan’s ISI.

When the Mujahideen took power in the early 1990s, MK Bhadrakumar, a senior diplomat well versed in the region’s affairs was dispatched. He met the new top leadership, including Burhanuddin Rabbani and Ahmed Shah Masud. Full advantage was taken of an airport refuelling stopover in Delhi by Rabbani and his men. The rapprochement took long, but it happened.

The diplomatic situation is many times more challenging, what with India being identified with the US and against the Sino-Pak alliance, with old allies Russia and Iran missing from its side.

India is a straggler in engaging with the Taliban leaders who have resented India. The past record has been one of mutual dislike and distrust. This is hardly the time to reminisce what India has done or can do in Afghanistan and the goodwill it has gained. The time is to salvage what is built and protect, even the embassy in Kabul and consulates in other Afghan cities.

This is by far the biggest diplomatic challenge with overwhelming security component that India faces in many years.